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1 Introduction
This paper considers compatibility in a platform (or two-sided) market which
is characterized by the interaction of three distinct parties: a platform (or in-
termediary) tries to attract two different groups of customers that use the
platform only if the other side does so too (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003;
Armstrong, 2006). Such demand interdependencies are, for instance, rele-
vant in the software industry where platforms (e.g., game consoles, media
players, operating systems) bring together users (gamers etc.) and applica-
tion developers (content providers etc.). In this context, compatibility (that
is, the search for a common standard) is an important aspect reflected in so-
called ‘standard wars’ (e.g., VHS/Betamax, Blu-ray/HD DVD). However, it
has only received relatively little attention in the literature so far.
We analyze platforms’ compatibility choices in a competitive-bottleneck setup
with single-homing users and multi-homing content developers. The main
difference with existing duopoly models (Doganoglu and Wright, 2006; Alexan-
drov, 2012) is that we allow for endogenous content both under incompat-
ibility and compatibility.1 In existing models, it is assumed that compat-
ibility means that a larger number of customers on each market side can
interact with each other. In other words, the amount of content available
to a user rises with compatibility. In contrast, we show that the amount
of content does not necessarily increase with compatibility but may also
decrease. Our key assumption is that participation of content providers is
endogenous. We identify two effects of compatibility on content creation: a
market-size effect and a price effect. Due to the market-size effect, content
providers have access to a larger number of users which increases the in-
centives to develop content. The price effect is novel: compatible platforms
may have lower incentives to subsidize the creation of content. If this ef-
fect is sufficiently strong, content provision may be lower when platforms
become compatible. However, we also characterize situations where com-
patibility results in lower license fees and thereby increases the amount of
available content.
Regarding welfare, our results are more ambiguous than in existing models.
1Miao (2009) investigates a monopolist’s incentives to introduce compatibility in a two-
sided market.
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We show that for uniformly distributed development costs, user surplus al-
ways decreases if products become compatible. This result only partly car-
ries over to nonuniform distributions. In particular, compatibility can be
particularly harmful to users as they may suffer from both higher prices
and less content. However, we also characterize situations (assuming a
nonuniform distribution of development costs) where user surplus can be
higher. In those situations, a positive content effect may compensate for
higher prices.
2 Model
The model we use is a competitive-bottleneck model with single-homing
users and multi-homing content developers (Armstrong, 2006; Choi, 2010).
Two symmetric platforms offering differentiated services to users are lo-
cated at opposite ends of a line of unit length (Hotelling, 1929). Platforms
compete for users by setting a user price pi and for content providers by
setting a license fee li (where i ∈ {1, 2}). Marginal costs and fixed costs
are normalized to zero. Introducing a common standard making platforms
compatible leads to fixed costs F per platform.
Users are uniformly distributed along the line. The utility of a user who is
located at x and who buys access to platforms 1 or 2, respectively, is given
by
u1 = v + θn1 − p1 − τx (1)
and
u2 = v + θn2 − p2 − τ(1− x). (2)
Users derive an intrinsic utility of v from connecting to a platform. More-
over, the utility increases with the amount of content ni that is available on
a platform. Users value each additional unit of content with θ and incur
transportation costs of τ if the platform’s location differs from the user’s
preferred location.
Assuming that the market is covered,2 the market share of a platform i can
2To this end, it is assumed that the intrinsic utility v is sufficiently high.
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be derived from equations (1) and (2):
si =
1
2
+
pj − pi
2τ
+
θ(ni − nj)
2τ
. (3)
There is a unit mass of content providers. Each content provider can of-
fer one variety of content and may multi-home, i.e., offer content at both
platforms. There are fixed investment costs f for offering content. Content
providers are heterogeneous with respect to these costs which are uniformly
distributed on the unit interval for now. Content providers generate income
of φ per user reached.
Thus, the profit of a content provider offering content on platform i is
pi = φsi − li − f.
Content providers offer their product on platform i if pi ≥ 0⇔ f ≤ φsi− li.
Hence, the amount of available content on platform i is equal to
ni = φsi − li. (4)
The timing is as follows: in the first stage, platforms jointly decide whether
to introduce compatibility or not (see also Doganoglu and Wright, 2006, and
Alexandrov, 2012). In the second stage, platforms simultaneously set prices
for users and license fees for content providers. In the third stage, users and
content providers decide which platform(s) to join.
3 Analysis
Incompatibility
Incompatibility means that content produced on one platform cannot be
accessed by users of the rival platform. Thus, platform market shares on
the user side depend on the amount of content available for the platform.
Similarly, content providers’ incentives to produce content depends on the
available number of users that can be reached on a platform. Hence, the
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demand of users and content providers is interrelated. Then, solving equa-
tions (3) and (4) simultaneously gives demands in terms of prices only:
si =
1
2
+
pj − pi
2(τ − θφ) +
θ(lj − li)
2(τ − θφ)
and
ni =
φ
2
+
φ(pj − pi)
2(τ − θφ) − li +
θφ(lj − li)
2(τ − θφ) .
Platforms choose prices for users and content developers so as to maximize
total profits given by
Πi = sipi + nili.
Optimal symmetric prices under incompatibility are then set at3
p∗ = τ − 3θφ+ φ
2
4
and
l∗ = −θ − φ
4
.
The user price is lower than the standard Hotelling price (e.g., Choi, 2010):
the price decreases with the size of the network effects θ and φ. The license
fee increases with the per-user profit φ but decreases with the benefit users
get from an additional unit of content θ. The intuition for this is simple: if
users value content highly (i.e., θ is large), platforms set a low license fee
to attract a large amount of content to become more attractive for users.
As θ becomes sufficiently large, platforms subsidize content providers (i.e.,
l∗ < 0).
Given platforms’ pricing strategies, the equilibrium amount of content on
each platform is
n∗ =
θ + φ
4
.
It is well known that compared to the efficient level in a competitive-bottleneck
model, there are too few content providers on each platform as the license
fee is excessive (Armstrong, 2006). Hence, an important factor for the wel-
3We focus on market-sharing equilibria which can be guaranteed by assuming that hor-
izontal differentiation is sufficiently large: 8τ > θ2 + 6θφ+ φ2.
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fare effects of introducing compatibility is whether it attracts a larger num-
ber of content providers.
The resulting platform profits amount to
Π∗ =
τ
2
− θ
2
16
− 3θφ
8
− φ
2
16
. (5)
Compatibility
Compatibility means that the two platforms agree on a common standard:
content created by any content provider can be used on both platforms, i.e.,
the same amount of content is available on either platform. Hence, user
market shares depend only on user prices
si =
1
2
+
pj − pi
2τ
.
It immediately follows that the equilibrium user price is identical to the
standard Hotelling price of p∗∗ = τ .
Content providers can reach all users via either platform. Hence, as there
is no differentiation among platforms from the developers’ point of view,
platforms face Bertrand competition. As a result, the license fee is competed
to zero: l∗∗ = 0. The equilibrium amount of content is then
n∗∗ = φ (6)
and equilibrium platform profits are
Π∗∗ =
τ
2
− F. (7)
Comparison
This subsection evaluates the welfare effects of introducing compatibility.
We start with users: their surplus depends on the user price and the access
to content. Due to the indirect network effects, user prices are higher under
compatibility than under incompatibility which hurts users.
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The impact of introducing compatibility on the amount of content is less
clear: on the one hand, a larger market size is available for content providers
under compatibility. This effect tends to increase the incentives to create
content. On the other hand, the license fee is affected by introducing com-
patibility. This effect may go either way: if content providers are subsidized
under incompatibility, the effect is negative. Otherwise, it is positive.
In total, if content providers are charged a positive price under incompati-
bility, compatibility leads to a lower fee and, hence, this tends to increase the
available amount of content. In turn, the total effect on equilibrium content
due to compatibility is positive. However, if providers are subsidized un-
der incompatibility, the two effects oppose each other and the overall impact
depends on the strength of the two effects. We summarize:
Proposition 1. Compatibility decreases content provision if n∗∗ < n∗ ⇔
3φ < θ and increases content provision otherwise.
In many markets, there is the worry that the multi-homing side (i.e., the con-
tent providers) faces excessive prices. In our model, such situations would
correspond to cases where φ > θ so that the license fee is positive. Our
results then suggest that compatibility plays a useful role through lower
license fees and an increase in the amount of content.
Neglecting any constants, user surplus is given by Ξ = v + θn− p. In equi-
librium, user surplus under incompatibility and compatibility amounts to
Ξ∗ =
φ2 + θ2
4
+ θφ− τ
and
Ξ∗∗ = θφ− τ .
Comparing user surplus across the two regimes, we find that users are bet-
ter off under incompatibility. Hence, for uniformly distributed developing
costs, even if the amount of content rises when products are compatible,
this effect is small and cannot compensate for the increase in the user price.
We point out, however, that this finding is not robust and relies on the as-
sumption of a uniform distribution. More generally, with a nonuniform
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distribution, either effect can dominate (see the discussion below).
Next we consider total welfare. First note that platforms agree on compati-
bility if profits increase. This is the case if fixed costs are not too high:
F <
θ2
16
+
3θφ
8
+
φ2
16
=: Fp.
Total welfare depends on the provision of content to users, i.e., on the license
fees. However, it does not depend on user prices as these are mere transfers
between users and platforms. Thus, total welfare consists of the following
elements: benefits of produced content (for users and content providers),
costs of producing content, and fixed costs for introducing compatibility.
Total welfare Ψ with and without compatibility is given by
Ψ∗ =
3(θ + φ)2
16
and
Ψ∗∗ = θφ+
φ2
2
− 2F.
Compatibility is socially desirable only if
F < −3θ
2
32
+
5θφ
16
+
5φ2
32
=: Fs.
Comparing Fp and Fs yields:
Proposition 2. Compatibility is insufficient if φ > 5θ/3. It is excessive if
φ < 5θ/3.
The private incentives to choose compatibility can be insufficient or exces-
sive. The result that compatibility can be insufficient is also obtained in a
model with multi-homing and a fixed number of content developers. Doganoglu
and Wright (2006) show that due to partial multi-homing, price competition
is rather weak under incompatibility which results in too little incentives
to introduce compatibility. The mechanism for insufficient compatibility is
different in our paper. From a social-welfare perspective, compatibility is
particularly desirable if content is increased, that is, if φ is relatively large
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(see Proposition 1). Besides the fixed cost, the private incentives to introduce
compatibility depend on how compatibility affects the income streams of
users and content providers. Revenues from users are increased due to re-
laxed price competition but this effect has no impact on total welfare. How-
ever, with lower license fees for content providers, there is lower license fee
income which reduces the incentives to invest in compatibility. This, how-
ever, would be desirable from a total welfare perspective. As a result, the
private incentives to introduce compatibility may be insufficient.
Alternative distributions of f
Let the cost be distributed on the unit interval according to the distribution
function G(f) = fγ . This formulation nests the base model with γ = 1.
With γ < 1 (γ > 1), the distribution function is concave (convex) meaning
that many developers have a rather low (high) investment cost.
We perform the same analysis as before but analytical results are cumber-
some to derive. Thus, we present our main results graphically. Setting
θ = 0.3 and φ = 0.8, the effect of compatibility on user surplus is ambigu-
ous and depends on the distribution of the development cost. Figure 1 plots
the user surplus in both scenarios and shows that the effect of introducing
compatibility becomes positive when the share of high-cost content is suf-
ficiently large (i.e., large γ). Figure 2 decomposes the effect into the price
and the content effect. Whereas both effects become smaller as γ becomes
larger, the figure illustrates that the content effect becomes relatively more
important.
[FIGURES about here]
References
Alexandrov, A. (2012). Anti-competitive interconnection: The effects of the
elasticity of consumers’ expectations and the shape of the network effects
function. Forthcoming in Journal of Industrial Economics.
Armstrong, M. (2006). Competition in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of
Economics, 37(3):668–691.
9
Choi, J. P. (2010). Tying in two-sided markets with multi-homing. Journal of
Industrial Economics, 58(3):607–626.
Doganoglu, T. and Wright, J. (2006). Multihoming and compatibility. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(1):45–67.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. Economic Journal, 39(153):41–
57.
Miao, C.-M. (2009). Limiting compatibility in two-sided markets. Review of
Network Economics, 8(4):346–364.
Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J. (2003). Platform competition in two-sided mar-
kets. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4):990–1029.
5 10
−0.5
0
0.5
γ
Ξ∗(γ)
Ξ∗∗(γ)
Figure 1: Comparison of user surplus in both scenarios for θ = 0.3, τ = 0.5,
and φ = 0.8.
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Figure 2: Effect of compatibility on price and content for θ = 0.3 andφ = 0.8.
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